We know what’s coming and we are prepared.
🇮🇱❌🇵🇸 A quick Israel-Gaza War thread on why dismantling Hamas as a military organization is quite hard, if not impossible:
This is an overly simplified illustration of the force structure of a Hamas battalion derived from reports as well as videos/imagery produced by the IDF, Hamas and others. Each green dot is a individual fighter, the blue boxes denote "tangible combat assets/kit", hypothetically located in fixed locations. Yellow rings around green circles denote individuals in leadership roles (who are presumably institutionally promotable).
Caveat emptor, the only organizations that actually have access to Hamas' Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) are Hamas and the IRGC (maybe). The IDF and US IC can see fragments of it, but not the whole picture, so this thread is speaking purely in broad brushstrokes.
First and foremost, unlike in most highly bureaucratized militaries, Hamas (and it appears most of Gaza's other militant orgs) devolve a massively outsized share of both their organizational logistical responsibilities and their combat power down to the "cell" level.
Think of their cells as being akin to Western-style fireteams with a handful of guys (a quick aside, Hamas 'does' have a formal rank/structure hierarchy - i.e. cells → to squads → to platoons → companies → brigades). There are multiple cells in a squad (so the above graphic really should have 2 or 3 of the blue blocks per squad).
Every cell is supposed to maintain/have a semi-standardized allotment of kit. The most shoddily equipped units have a mixture of RPGs and AKs, but some (well... most apparently) cells have better/more niche equipment, e.g. EFPs and ballistic protection. There are also specialized anti-tank and sniper teams, but I haven't seen any footage of their caches being pinched. (...)
Hamas' military is fundamentally a devolved hierarchy with a bottom-heavy logistical structure. That is to say, their units are specifically designed to operate in a semi-autonomous fashion, as opposed to functioning in larger cohesive units. (...)
With organizations like Hamas, because they're not necessarily functioning as discrete units like most Westerners are accustomed to, neutralizing their battalion echelon and above leaders or blowing up their larger supply hubs, does not in and of itself render their units incapable of fighting or "destroy them."
That's why, reports of the "destruction" of Hamas battalions/brigades are usually dramatically overstated.
📎 Analytica Camillus
🧵 https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1759114538903834880.html
🇺🇸 #Oklahoma high school principal (Kirk Moore) seen charging at and disarming a school shooter.
The suspect, identified as 20-year-old Victor Hawkins, was a former student who said he wanted to shoot up the school “like the Columbine shooters did.” While taking down the shooter, Moore was shot in the leg. He is expected to recover.
When the Principal woke up that day, he never thought he would be tackling a gunman.
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🇨🇳🛢 How much strategic oil does the world actually have in reserve?
Global strategic crude oil inventories stood at ~2.5 BILLION barrels as of December 2025, according to the US Energy Information Administration.
China holds by far the largest stockpile at 1,397 million barrels, more than 3 times the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve of 413 million barrels, which itself sits at only 58% of its full storage capacity of 714 million barrels.
China added an average of 1.1 million barrels per day to its strategic inventories throughout 2025, with preliminary data suggesting it continued building stockpiles in early 2026 ahead of the Iran War.
Japan holds the 3rd-largest reserve at 263 million barrels, followed by OECD European countries at 179 million barrels.
Meanwhile, the US is releasing 172 million barrels from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve to suppress oil prices, part of a broader 400 million barrel coordinated release agreed by 32 IEA member nations in March.
🔗 ...
🛢 JP Morgan Warns Oil Market Out of Balance, Prices Must Rise
🔸The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil flows, has removed 13.7 million barrels per day from global supply in April alone. A JP Morgan research note warns the market has no good way to replace it.
🔸Normally, spare production capacity in Saudi Arabia and the UAE acts as the market’s shock absorber. But that buffer has effectively been removed, eliminating the system’s first line of defense.
🔸With spare capacity unavailable, markets turned to inventories
➤ Global stockpiles are now being drained at ~7.1 mbd in April, an extraordinary pace, according to the note.
🔸Meanwhile, demand is collapsing because supply simply isn’t reaching users — “forced demand destruction.”The hardest hit sectors include:
▪️ Petrochemical plants across Asia are shutting down or slashing output as LPG, ethane, and naphtha flows from the Gulf collapse
▪️ Airline jet fuel ...
🛢⛽️ Global oil inventories are heading toward RECORD LOWS:
Global visible oil inventories have fallen -255 million barrels since the start of the conflict on February 27, to 7,864 million barrels.
Total estimated oil draws, including non-OECD refined products storage, have accelerated to 10.9 million barrels per day in April, the largest monthly draws on record since 2017.
Cumulative estimated draws since the start of the war now stand at 474 million barrels, with Hormuz flows holding at ~10% of normal, or 2.0 million barrels per day.
Meanwhile, even in an optimistic scenario where Strait of Hormuz flows begin recovering by late April, it is unlikely to prevent global visible inventories from reaching all-time lows, according to Goldman Sachs.
As inventories keep falling, physical oil markets are likely to require sharply higher prices for immediate delivery, since buyers cannot wait months for cheaper futures delivery when stocks are running critically low.
Goldman also warns...
