⚡️ - Some of my observations, now that nearly a month of this (4 day) war has passed:

• Israel's interceptor arsenal, except the Iron Dome, has hit a critical stage more than a week ago. It's "Arrow-II/III" inventory is nearly completely depleted; thus the chance of impacts increased exponentially.

• The degradation of CENTCOM radars has been apparent since the very start of the conflict, after Iranian strikes. To compensate, the USAF has been conducting more AWACS sorties, including "E-3B Sentry", "E-2 Hawkeye" AEW and "U-2".

• Israel expended a large % of it's stand-off munitions in this campaign, nearly half. This would not be the case if their use was not necessary.

• The IAF and the USAF are capable of entering deep into Iranian airspace due to established air-corridors made possible through Iran's mountainous terrain, which also makes Iranian IADS coverage limited. This is paired with the US Navy's TLAM strikes targeting these installations, alongside USAF HARM strikes & EW jamming (eg. "EA-18G" ) .

• Iran recognizes the threat, and thus is seemingly depending on EO/IR air-defenses for interceptions.

• Israel's ISR capabilities have been pretty much diminished, after the nearly complete destruction of it's MALE UCAV inventory. The effects of this change the entire equation and are devastating in every axis. The IAF cannot conduct effective TEL hunting operations and is now forced to only strike pre-destined targets. This means the IRGC gets to launch Ballistic Missiles freely across a large area. To counter this, the coalition continues to attempt and suppress SSM UGFs through stand-off munition strikes on entry points across Iran, and even bunker-busting munitions (eg. "GBU-72" ) in the south of Iran.

• In Lebanon, Hezbollah's activities surpass even last year's, setting a new record everyday, despite the heavy blows in the last campaign. Again, the loss of IAF ISR has given Hezbollah near complete freedom in it's Long range missile launches, it's ground ATGM installations, ground movements and withdrawals, and drone launches.

• Hezbollah's tempo has changed significantly from last year, and is now largely conducting hit-and-run strikes on the IDF, through the use of ATGMs, FPV drones and loitering drones, then proceeding to withdraw, ensuring a life-conserving approach while executing the most amount of damage possible. This in turn however leads to the IDF, which is conducting frequent spearhead attacks, to advance quickly.

• The coalition recognizes that the Iranian government will not fall from this conflict, and has thus redefined it's objectives early on, into creating a new precedent where the IAF and the USAF get to "mow the lawn" in Iran without global outrage, ensuring the constant denial of IADS and offensive rebuilding capabilities of Iran, similar to it's approach in Gaza over the years. This is why the coalition's PR campaign has largely focused on the destruction of Iran's conventional capabilities, such as it's Navy warships and Fighter Jets, despite them not presenting a real threat to either.

• An American ground special operation seems inevitable, the "31st MEU" "160th SOAR", "[?] SFG", "5th SOG", Rangers, and SEALs have been moved to the theater.